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For many coastal destinations, its intrinsic aspects serve as key features in attracting 
visitors. Although the risk of exposure to natural hazards exist, tourism stakeholders may 
be reluctant towards adopting structural mitigation strategies in fear of negatively 
impacting local scenery. Although literature has identified how the accommodation industry 
can contribute in a variety of non-structural mitigation activities, the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake saw limited adoption of official evacuation hotels along the coast. This research 
examines public-private collaboration across Japan in order to identify barriers in 
collaboration and how the existence of destination marketing organization can overcome 
these barriers, and methods utilized towards successful collaborative outcomes. 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Tourism Vulnerabilities to Natural Hazards 
 For many coastal destinations, the ocean is one of the primary intrinsic assets used to 
attract visitors. Due to its rapid growths in the economy and tourism development, the Asia-Pacific 
is predicted to become the largest tourism region in the world, and projected to welcoming over 535 
million tourists by 2030 [1][2]. However, as much of the Asia-Pacific rim lies within the ring-of-fire, 
these coastal destinations are vulnerable to a multitude of natural hazards which include: tropical 
cyclones, flooding, earthquakes, landslides, and tsunamis. Despite these vulnerabilities, local 
planners may be adverse towards structural mitigation strategies, due to fears of altering local 
landscapes and negatively impacting the tourism experience [3]. Planners may also be reluctant to 
support mitigation measures against low-risk but high impact disasters such as large tsunamis, due 
to the high costs of development and long-term maintenance. Non-structural mitigation can be an 
alternative solution that can be less costly and reduce exposure to hazards, prevent loss of life, and 
strengthen destination disaster resiliency [4]. Indeed, research on the 2011 Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJE) have found strong correlation between mortality rates and a 
municipalities social capital and political orientation [5]. 
 The addition of tourists to a destination’s population exposes a new demographics group 
to natural hazards. The transient population may be unaware of local hazard risks, may lack 
knowledge on personal safety strategies, and may possess risk perceptions that differ from the local 
permanent population. The gap between the local community’s risk perception and transient 
population was seen during in Khao Lak, Thailand during the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami where 
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tourists accounted for nearly half of the fatalities. Those who survived stated that they were unaware 
of local hazards and disaster evacuation routes [6]. Kelman et al interviewed British tourists visiting 
locations affected by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Interview results demonstrate that although 
some interviewees began evacuation procedures after noticing initial tremors, many others did not 
evacuate and remained in the same location after shaking. In addition, in Sri Lanka, located far from 
the epicenter to notice shaking, suffered the second highest tsunami related casualties in 2004 [7]. 
 Although hotel and resorts continue to attract investments into hazard prone areas where 
risks are inadequately addressed, they also represent opportunities to contribute to local area 
disaster resiliency through a variety of disaster risk management strategies. According to a United 
Nation’s report, hotels and resorts possess the tallest and physically strongest structure in a coastal 
area, allowing it to withstand the impacts of tsunamis and function as a vertical evacuation building. 
Its large room capacity can serve as short-term refuge during the recovery phase of a disaster, while 
it’s the presence of large food stock and back up electric generators can be utilized by evacuees. In 
addition, as hotels and resorts are usually one of the major origin-destination points for travelers, 
they can become prime locations for the dissemination of hazard risk reduction information [8].  
 Despite the potential of hotels and resorts during disasters, the UNISDR Global Assessment 
Report has found that while the hotel industry is able to manage low impact hazard events well, 
extreme events are often poorly managed. Many hotels do not have the mechanism to reduce risks 
and be prepared for disasters [9]. As with the case in Khao Lak, Thailand, hotels and resorts disagreed 
over their role and responsibilities in informing and evacuating tourists. Other tourism businesses 
stated they lacked money, necessary manpower, or knowledge that prevented them from assisting 





Figure 1 Location of our case studies. All three municipalities are coastal towns with small 
populations and significant vulnerability to earthquake and tsunami hazards 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 Existing research in Japan have identified that in several of the cities that were devastated 
by the 2011 GEJE, such as Ishinomaki and Kesennuma, multiple hotels received evacuees. Prior to 
the tsunami, owners and managers had offered their hotels to local officials in hopes of being 
officially recognized as official evacuation buildings [11][12]. This research examines public-private 
collaboration in Japan and the outcomes it has produced towards disaster risk management among 
the hotel industry since 2011. For the purpose of this research, we have chosen two coastal cities in 
Tohoku, the region most devastated by GEJE, and examine how local governments and the hotel 
industry have collaborated towards implementing hotel based disaster risk management and 
improving destination resiliency. Additionally, a third city located in southern Japan in Okinawa 
Prefecture, was chosen due to its similar tsunami hazard risk as well as the presence of an 
established Destination Marketing Organization (DMO)(Fig 1).  
Through this comparison, this research first examines the nature of public-private 
collaboration in two municipalities in the Tohoku Region, Matsushima Town and Miyako City, and 
seeks to discover how disaster risk management between the municipality and hotels have changed 
after 2011, and what kind of barriers may exist that prevent the adoption of disaster risk 
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management initiatives. Secondly, by adding a third city, Ishigaki, this research examines how the 
existence of a DMO can influence collaborative planning outcomes towards disaster risk 
management and what lessons can be adopted by tourism stakeholders. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Collaborative Planning Theory  
 Collaborative planning is broadly defined as a collective process for participants to resolve 
their conflicts and to advance shared visions among a diverse set of stakeholders [13] [14]. It differs 
from other participatory methods in that it emphasizes voluntary participation, face to face dialogue, 
social learning, and consensus based agreements [15] [16] [17]. The level of involvement between 
stakeholders surpasses other planning processes and can be seen as a strategy to deal with conflict 
where other practices have failed [18]. Local stakeholders are encouraged to define and develop 
policy agendas that affect their place [19].  
 The primary benefit of collaborative planning is that it is more likely to resolve conflict 
among competing stakeholders than other methods as it identifies solutions that needs the mutual 
needs of all parties than individual groups [18] [20]. Through dialogue, emancipatory knowledge can 
be achieved via the engagement of all those with differing interests and stakes. However for this 
knowledge to emerge, stakeholders must be equally informed, listened to, respected, and none can 
be accorded more power than the others. High quality agreements are produced and are easier to 
implement and more durable due to the consideration of a wide range of interests, and are likely to 
be innovative due to being the outcome of dynamic interchange. Collaborative approaches in urban 
planning also strengthens institutional capacity through their effects on knowledge, relational 
resources, and the capacity for mobilization. Social capital is generated which lead to new or 
strengthened relationships, which Booher refers to as second order effects. Further successful 
collaborations can even spawn third order effects which include spin-off partnerships, new 
collaborations, the emergence of new norms or the establishment of new institutions [15]. 
 Despite the benefits of collaborative planning, a number of obstacles have been identified 
that may dissuade stakeholders from participating. Due its emphasize on dialogue and consensus 
building, collaborative planning has been viewed as being time intensive [21]. Due to the amount of 
time required, stakeholders have felt that a collaborative approach can be inefficient. Unfortunately 
research that cans identify that efforts to improve its use in urban planning have been limited by the 
lack of useful evaluation methodologies [22]. Secondly, despite efforts to limit power imbalances 
that may emerge from the presence of influential stakeholders, asymmetrical distribution of 
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negotiation skills and resources may allow such stakeholders to continue to dominate the 
collaborative processes [23] [20].  
 
2.2 Destination Marketing Organizations 
 The predecessors to DMOs were established in the early 20th century. Many of these 
pioneer DMOs formed in the distant peripheries of the world, such as the establishment of the New 
Zealand Department of Tourist and Health Resorts in 1901, Hawaii Visitors Bureau in 1903, and 
similar organizations in Jersey and Hong Kong. However it was primarily throughout the 1980s and 
1990s that witnessed the rapid world-wide expansion of convention visitor’s bureaus (CVB). 
Essentially, the terms CVB and DMO are interchangeable. Referred to as CVBs for many decades, 
destination marketing organizations began identifying themselves as DMOs in an effort to convey a 
less bureaucratic connotation to tourists [24].  
The primary motivation for government intervention in tourism is due to growth 
opportunities. For DMOs, their purpose is to achieve, enhance and sustain destination 
competitiveness. To achieve this, DMOs are expected to coordinate stakeholders from relevant 
industries, monitor service and quality standards and foster community relations [25]. Significant 
levels of cooperation and coordination, both within government departments, and between 
government and industries are required. Only governments can provide such coordination due to 
access to revenue and ability to legislate, otherwise many DMOs at any administrative level will not 
be able to function.  
Destination collaboration at the community level is a complex task due to the general lack 
of financial and human resources, biased interest among stakeholders, and insufficient 
understanding of local communities on tourism marketing [26] [27]. The fragmented nature of the 
tourism industry is such in which no single agency can control and deliver a rich combination of a 
tourism product and service portfolio at a destination [28] [29]. Executing collaborative strategy 
depends on a great deal of coordination, communication and consensus building which engender 
negotiations and even confrontation [30]. DMOs serve as the nerve center for collaboration, their 
roles as a convener in the process of community-based tourism planning as a result of its legitimacy, 
expertise, resources, and authority. Through collaboration, the different ideologies and values 
among tourism stakeholders can be reconciled, efforts made at understanding key issues, and 
consensus building [31]. Although many DMOs are funded via public sources, they funding are also 
collected through businesses tax such as room taxes. The funding structures lead to a cooperative 




No destination is immune to natural hazards, thus for DMOs, the development of recovery 
strategies with local governments are imperative. Although rebuilding infrastructure is beyond the 
scope of most DMOS, they nevertheless can play key roles during a crises, mainly to stop or minimize 
panic, define roles and responsibilities, and to develop countermeasures alongside other tourism 
stakeholders. According to Pike, DMOs contribute towards disaster management through the 
following actions: The creation of a disaster management task force, creating a disaster management 
plan, develop scenario building, establish effective media relations, support local businesses, 
enhance disaster risk awareness among tourism operators,  and outsourcing certain roles when 
needed [25]. Example of DMO responses to crises were seen during the aftermath of the United 
Kingdom’s foot and mouth outbreak that saw 40 million pound marketing plan to recovery tourism, 





3.1 Research Design 
As of 2016, 13 percent of research on tourism and disaster management utilized mixed 
methods, compared to 51 percent utilizing qualitative methods and 36 percent that adopted 
quantitative methods. This research adopts a mixed-methodology of data collection and analysis. A 
sequential explanatory approach where quantitative data collection and analysis is used in the first 
phase, then followed by a qualitative phase in which qualitative information is collected in order to 
further explain and interpret the quantitative findings [34]. Guiding this research, we adopted a 
framework designed to examine the public-private collaboration process from stakeholder 
perspectives on disaster management [35]. 
 
3.2 Survey Design 
 The quantitative phase utilized a three part survey which asked four questions relating to 
barriers in adopting the following hotel based disaster risk management initiatives: participation as 
an evacuation building, availability of a multi-lingual disaster information for tourists, the existence 
of emergency electricity and provisions for evacuees during a disaster, and disaster training for hotel 
staff. Following this, respondents were then asked to complete a six question survey utilizing a seven 
point likert scale, which measured interviewee's attitude towards the current collaboration process 
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with other stakeholders towards hotel-based disaster management. The six questions asked 
respondents to rate whether there were incentives to collaborate with other stakeholders, if equal 
opportunities were afforded, whether they benefitted from having their needs met, if sufficient time 
was given to understand information and make decisions, if facilitation was independent, and 
whether agreements were done through consensus. 
 The qualitative phase was conducted either simultaneously during the quantitative phase 
or shortly after, depending on the mood of the interviewee. This phase consisted of a semi-
structured interview which asked interviewees their experiences during the 2011 disasters, and 
what kind of changes in disaster preparedness has occurred afterwards. Interviewees were then 
shown examples of disaster preparedness initiatives, such as multi-lingual pamphlets utilized 
elsewhere in Japan such as in Atami and Ishigaki, and what other hotels were doing to prepare 
themselves. Interviewees would reply with their opinion on these activities, whether it was needed, 
what was preventing them from adopting it, and what they would like to see from now on. 
 
3.3 Case Studies 
 A case study research design was adopted due to its usefulness in investigating “how” and 
“why” type questions in regards to examining a set of events over which the investigator has little to 
no control over [36]. Key variables can be derived from case study approaches [37]. A multiple-case 
study approach is utilized, with three cities chosen for the basis of this research, providing a more 
robust analytical conclusions and increasing external validity when compared to a single case study. 
For the purposes of triangulation, two cities were chosen for the purpose of literal replication, where 
results between the two cases are expected to be similar. The third city was chosen for the purpose 
of theoretical replication, predicting contrasting results but for predictable reasons [36].  
Matsushima Town was chosen for the pilot study, due to its close proximity to our research 
institution, as well as being the most renowned coastal tourism destination the Tohoku Region. 
Miyako City, a coastal city located 160 kilometers north of Matsushima and also affected by the 2011 
GEJE, was chosen for the purpose literal replication. Finally, Ishigaki City was chosen for the purpose 
of theoretical replication due to the presence of a DMO as well as its similar population size to the 
aforementioned municipalities which may highlight the scale of problems facing small cities. 
 Within the identified case study cities, we conducted a census of all hotels found within 
tsunami inundation zones identified by municipal and prefectural maps. In Matsushima, six of the 
eight hotels agreed to be interviewed, a response rate of 75 percent. In Ishigaki, eight out of twelve 
hotels were interviewed, a response rate of 67 percent. Finally, six out of seven hotels in Miyako 
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agreed to be interview, a response rate of 86 percent. In addition to the hotels, we interviewed the 
municipal governments of all three cities, usually consisting of a representative from the 
disaster/crisis management division, and the tourism division. The inclusion of both divisions stems 
from overlapping responsibilities for tourism disaster management. For example evacuation 
buildings and evacuation training falls within the jurisdiction of the disaster/crises management 
division while disaster education and communication falls within the tourism division. Interviews 
were also conducted with the prefectural government’s tourism division, but did not focus on 
disaster preparedness policies with hotels as such responsibilities belong with the local governments. 
Instead, we asked prefectural representatives about information related to the creation of DMOs, 
purposes, and direction in relation to disaster management. Similarly, interviews were conducted 
with OCVB, Okinawa Prefecture’s DMO, and the emerging Sanriku DMO of Iwate Prefecture, and 
Miyagi Minami DMO. DMO related questions were the same as those asked to the prefectural 
governments. 
  
4. A Tale of Three Cities 
4.1 Ishigaki City 
 Ishigaki City is located in Okinawa Prefecture, Japan’s southernmost prefecture, and the 
only administrative division to consist entirely of small islands. Ishigaki City consists of Ishigakijima 
(or Ishigaki island), and the Senkaku Islands whose ownership is disputed with the People’s Republic 
of China, and the Republic of China. Ishigakijima, alongside neighboring islands of Taketomi, Iriomote, 
Hateruma, Kohama, Hatoma, and Kuro Islands, form the Yaeyama Region encompassing the 
southern half of the prefecture. Most of the Ishigaki City’s population of 49,000, is concentrated on 
the southern coastline of Ishigakijima.  
Historically, Ishigakijima’s economy centered upon agriculture, particularly sugar cane plantations, 
and textiles. The conclusion of World War 2 led to United States occupation and administration of 
Okinawa Prefecture. Upon reversion to Japan from US control in 1972, the Japanese government 
enacted a series of five ten-year development plans which sought to expedite the development of 
the islands to match the rapid economic development ongoing in the Japanese mainland. These 
plans re-imagined Okinawa as a tourism destination and sought the expansion of transportation links 
and the construction of resort hotels. While much of the development was focused on Okinawa 
Main Island, Ishigakijima was to become the epicenter of tourism in the Yaeyama Region [38]. As a 
result of these plans annual visitor numbers skyrocketed from less than 10,000 in 1973 to roughly 
1.3 million visitors in 2016 [39].  
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 Although Ishigaki City has not experienced any recent large tsunamis, the entire Yaeyama 
Region experienced multiple catastrophic tsunamis in the past. The most recent large tsunami was 
the 1771 Great Meiwa Tsunami, which is recorded to have killed 9,313 people in the Yaeyama Region, 
with 8,481 of those deaths in Ishigakijima alone. Monuments and folktalkes of the tsunami persist 
today, a testament to the tsunami’s widespread devastation. Research on tsunami boulders estimate 
that Ishigakijima’s tsunami intervals at every 250 to 400 years, with a majority of the stones found 
along its southern coast [40]. Based on this evidence, eight tsunamis have struck Ishigakijima during 
the last 2400 years: 250±100 B.C., A.D. 200±100, A.D. 550±100, A.D. 800±100, A.D. 1100±100, A.D. 
1400±100, A.D. 1625, and 1771 [41]. Over 55 percent of of Ishigaki City’s population reside along 
the southern coastline of Ishigakijima, exposing a large number of residents and tourists to tsunami 
hazards [42]. Our case study research in Ishigaki City will only focus its southern coastal hotels, due 
to its population density. Historically of the 8,481 deaths during the 1771 tsunami, 81 percent of the 
deaths were in this southern coast line. Although the northern-eastern part of the island, such as 
the Inoda, Ibaruma, and Yasura districts witnessed over 90 percent of its population perish to 
tsunami waves, they were excluded from this study as there are currently no hotels in the area. 
 
4.2 Miyako City 
 Miyako City is located on the eastern coast of Iwate Prefecture, Tohoku’s largest 
administrative division and second largest in Japan. Although it’s population of 55,000 is similar in 
size to Ishigaki City, the city spans over a large area over 1,250 square kilometers. Despite the city’s 
large size, it is sparsely populated with much of the land consisting of steep mountains. The majority 
of the city’s population resides around Miyako Bay and the mouth of the Hei River, as well as a small 
cluster of people around the Taro district up north.  
Miyako is renowned as Japan’s city of fish, exemplified by its mascot being a large salmon. 
The fishing industry, alongside its agriculture industry plays the primary role in the city’s economy. 
It’s tourism industry remains modest with only 1.2 million visitors in 2016 (The method of counting 
tourists differs substantially in the Tohoku prefectures when compared to Okinawa, thus while 
Miyako’s annual visitor numbers appear far larger than Ishigaki’s) [43]. Despite its limited tourism 
infrastructure, the city has made ambitious goals in strengthening is tourism sector as a means to 
revitalize the local economy. With the 2013 establishment of the Sanriku Fukko National Park, 
Miyako hopes to capitalize with its famed Jodogahama Beach, also designated as the nation’s place 




 The Sanriku area was devastated multiple times by large tsunamis, such as the 1896 
Sanriku Earthquake brought tsunami waves of 18.9 meter, the 1933 Sanriku Earthquake that 
destroyed 98% of Miyako’s buildings, and the 2011 GEJE that led to the largest tsunami wave of 19 
meters, inundating the city and contributing to the confirmed deaths of 420 and the destruction of 
4,005 buildings. The experiences with devastating tsunamis has led to heavy fortification of the city’s 
coastline, yet in spite of these physical mitigation strategies, one of the most iconic images of the 
2011 GEJE disaster was that of the tsunami waves overcoming the seawalls. 
 
4.3 Matsushima Town 
Matsushima Town is located on the eastern coast of Miyagi Prefecture, within close 
proximity to Sendai City, the capital of Miyagi Prefecture as well as being Tohoku’s most populous 
municipality. Due to its small population of approximately 15,000, Matsushima is designated as a 
town, while municipalities with a population of roughly 50,000 and over are categorized as a city. 
While agriculture and its commercial fishing industry are significant contributors to the town’s 
economy, tourism plays the largest role contributing to roughly 60 percent of its revenue [44]. 
Matsushima is renowned as one of the Nihon Sankei, or Japan's three Great Scenic Views, 
alongside Miyajima in Hiroshima Prefecture and Amanohashidate in Kyoto Prefecture. Visitors to the 
town are able to travel by ferry to view the 260 islets that adorn the bay, as well as multiple historic 
temples and shrines. It’s close proximity to Sendai City and Sendai Airport attracts many tourists 
residing there.   
While Matsushima Town is exposed to many of the same coastal hazards that many cities 
along Tohoku's coast line faces, the presence of its islets functioned as a buffer for tsunami waves. 
As a result, while neighboring Shiogama and Higashi-Matsushima cities were devastated in 2011, 
Matsushima received relatively light damage, being inundated by waves between 3 to 4 meters, only 
three deaths, and 219 houses destroyed. However despite the limited physical damages, 
transportation operations were suspended for a month and annual tourism numbers have yet to 
recover to pre disaster levels. As of 2016, tourism recovery appears to have stagnated. 
  
5. Results: Hotel based disaster risk reduction initiatives   
The most recent prefectural and municipal policies and plans were reviewed in order to 
determine official stances in six areas of disaster risk management: If tourism is considered a vital 
part of the economy, if tourism vulnerability to natural hazards is identified, the need for vertical 
evacuation, the need for multi-lingual hazard risk information, the need to maintain a supply of 
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emergency food stock and generators, and the need for evacuation training in hotels. These plans 
do not necessarily imply that the municipal government has already adopted these initiatives, but 
that they are striving to reach these goals. Of the three case studies, Ishigaki was the most robust, 
with all six areas identified in its plans at both the municipal level and at the prefectural level. This 
was followed by Matsushima which published two plans related to tourism and disasters, when 
combined, addresses all six areas. It is important to note that at the prefectural level, disaster plans 
were limited in identifying vulnerabilities to tourism, which was then amended in an update to 
include all areas except hotel evacuation training. Miyako came last with municipal plans addressing 
only the importance of tourism, its vulnerabilities and the need for emergency stock. Although 
vertical evacuation was briefly mentioned in the plans, there were no details provided. Similarly at 
the prefectural level, while it acknowledged tourism as a key part of the economy and its 
vulnerability to hazards, it was lackluster in identifying hotel based disaster risk reduction and 
preparedness initiatives (Table 1). The following surveys and interviews sought to determine the 





Table 1 A compilation of key features from the most recent disaster and tourism related plans at 







































































2015 Miyagi Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan  O  O  O 
2015 Miyagi Prefecture Tsunami Counter-Measures   O     
2015 Miyagi Prefecture Tsunami Counter-Measures Update O O O O O  
2015 Matsushima Town Disaster Prevention  O O O  O O 
2015 Matsushima Town Tourism Recovery Plan  O O  O   
2016 Iwate Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan O O O ?  ? 
2011 Iwate Prefecture GEJE Recovery Plan  O O     
2014 Second basic plan for the development of Iwate’s Michinoku 
tourism development 
O O     
2015 Miyako Comprehensive Town Plan  O  ?    
2016 Miyako City Regional Disaster Prevention Plan   O   O  
Miyako Water Disaster Prevention Plan (no year)  O     
2013-15 Okinawa Prefecture Regional Disaster Prevention Plan  O O O O O O 
2015 Okinawa Prefecture Tourism Risk Control Plan  O O O O O O 
2012 Ishigaki City Regional Disaster Prevention Plan  O O O O O O 




Figure 2 Percentage of hotels volunteering to function as evacuation buildings and refuge, and 
barriers towards its adoption 
  
We first examined how many hotels that were located in tsunami hazard areas and met 
requirements to function as a vertical evacuation building. Guidelines for vertical evacuation are 
covered by the 2005 National Guideline for Tsunami Evacuation Buildings. These guidelines broadly 
define evacuation buildings as those that meet certain conditions allowing them to function as an 
evacuation facility, such as use of steel or reinforced concrete, seismic safety, and number of floors 
relative to estimated inundation levels. However it is up to the municipality to further define these 
conditions based on specific local needs [45]. Based on our interviews, Ishigaki City went beyond 
national guidelines and established their own guidelines which limit tsunami evacuation buildings 
to those that are five stories or higher. Matsuhima and Miyako follow the national guidelines but 
have yet to establish their own specific conditions. 
With these conditions in mind, we surveyed all hotels in tsunami inundation zones, with 
Ishigaki’s hotels being five stories or higher, to determine the situation regarding the adoption of 
hotels as tsunami evacuation buildings. Based on our results, Ishigaki led by far, with 88 percent of 
the interviewed hotels already functioning as a tsunami vertical evacuation building. 12 percent 
indicated that their hotel does not need to function as an evacuation hotel due to its location, 
despite neighboring hotels already being designated as such. It should be noted that although this 




Hotels as Evacuation Buildings and Refuge
Adopted No Money No Knowledge No Manpower Not Needed
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is a high adoption rate, many of the hotels that did not respond to our interview requests were those 
designated as evacuation buildings. Had all hotels been successfully interviewed, it is predicted that 
the adoption rate of evacuation buildings would be approximately 67% (Fig 2).  
In contrast, in Miyako and Matsushima, the adoption rate was lower at 33 percent. While 
Miyako adopted non-standardized signs that identified a hotel as an evacuation building, 
Matsuhima’s hotels did not have any such signs. Their existence as evacuation buildings was 
discovered through interviews with hotel managers which acknowledged themselves as sites for 
evacuation. Despite its low adoption rate, nearly all interviewed hotels in Matsushima received 
evacuees during the 2011 tsunami, while some hotels in Miyako received evacuees due to the low 
tourism numbers for that city. The remaining hotels in Matsushima that were not identified as official 
evacuation hotels expressed interest in becoming official evacuation hotels, but 33 percent stating 
financial problems as limiting adoption, another 33 percent expressing manpower limitations, and 
17 percent stating lack of knowledge on functioning as an evacuation building. In Miyako, half of the 
hotels interviewed stated a lack of money as the primary problem. This stems from heavier damages 
received than Matsushima in 2011, and a significant decline in tourism numbers, which affected 
hotels’ revenue. 33 percent of the hotels in Miyako felt they were unable to function as an 
evacuation building due to lack of knowledge. Officially, Matsushima prefers tourists to evacuate to 





5.2 The adoption of multi-lingual hazard risk information 
 
Figure 3 Percentage of hotels adopting multilingual hazard risk information pamphlets for tourists, 
and barriers towards its adoption 
 The next question examined the presence of multi-lingual disaster information in the form 
of manuals or pamphlets for tourists in all three cities, and challenges in either its creation or 
adoption. Okinawa’s DMO, the Okinawa Convention Visitor’s Bureau (OCVB), estimated that roughly 
half of the hotels across Okinawa Prefecture have placed multi-lingual pamphlets in their hotel 
rooms. Our survey reveals that OCVB’s estimates are correct as half of the hotels we visited had 
adopted the pamphlets. 25 percent had no knowledge about the existence of these pamphlets but 
have expressed interest in adopting it after the interview. 13 percent of Ishigaki’s hotels felt that the 
pamphlets were not necessary (Fig 3).  
In the case of Matsushima, the town developed alongside with Sendai City, a similar multi-
lingual pamphlet that not as detailed as OCVB’s but is smaller and portable. However none of the 
hotels interviewed had seen the pamphlets but felt its existence would be important. Half of the 
hotels felt that there would be no money for the research or adoption of such a manual, while 83 
percent had no knowledge of it. Matsushima town itself wanted to create a more in depth pamphlet 
comparable to OCVB’s but stated a lack of manpower and knowledge prevented them from creating 
one. Miyako, did not have a multi-lingual pamphlets for hotels, but did develop a Japanese-English 
manual for foreign residents. Half of the hotels in Miyako stated that there was likely no money in 




Multilingual Hazard Risk Pamphlets
Adopted No Money No Knowledge No Manpower Not Needed
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developing or adopting such manuals, another half stating no knowledge on developing a manual 
or its existence, and 33 percent stating lack of human resources. The city stated that OCVB’s manual 
was the gold standard of tourism disaster manuals but due to the low number of foreign tourists, 
other reconstruction issues are being prioritized for the time being. Miyako representatives felt that 
if they were to make such a manual, it would first identify hazard risks from local fauna and flora, 
followed by typhoons, earthquakes, then tsunamis in level of frequency, and would be translated 
into Japanese, English, Chinese, and Thai. 
 
5.3 The adoption of evacuation drills and training at hotels 
 
Figure 4 Percentage of hotels practicing evacuation drills and related training activities, and 
barriers towards its adoption 
 The National Fire Services Law requires all hotels in the country to conduct at least two 
evacuation drills per year. The type of drills are not specifically defined and can be left at the hotel’s 
discretion, for example a hotel can choose to have two drills for fire emergencies or one drill for 
typhoons and another for tsunamis. Hotels are required to submit an evacuation plan to their district 
fire station for approval. Despite such a law, our surveys revealed that many hotels did not practice 
evacuation drills twice a year, and some did not practice at all. In Ishigaki, 75 percent of the 
interviewed hotels practiced annual drills with 13 percent citing lack of money to participate, 
another 13 percent citing lack of man power, and 13 percent citing lack of knowledge. These 




Evacuation Drills and Training
Adopted No Money No Knowledge No Manpower Not Needed
17 
 
problems are inter-related as the limited number of staff that is needed to check-in guests. 
Matsushima is second with 67 percent of the hotels practicing in fire drills. A few of the hotels 
interviewed, only began such drills after 2011. Lack of knowledge, man power, and money stood at 
17 percent each. Miyako was the lowest with only 17 percent of the hotels engaged in annual 
training and half citing lack of manpower, and 67 percent citing lack of knowledge. Hotels were 
pessimistic about their abilities to take care of tourists due to the declining number of tourists, 
extremely limited number of staff, and priorities on the recovery process (Fig 4). 
 
5.4 The adoption of emergency supplies 
 
Figure 5 Percentage of hotels maintaining emergency generators and provisions for emergencies, 
and barriers towards its adoption 
While Ishigaki has led Matsushima and Miyako in terms of evacuation building adoption 
rates, the proliferation of disaster information for tourists, and evacuation training, Matsushima led 
in terms of emergency supplies for hotel evacuees at 50 percent, followed by Ishigaki at 38 percent, 
and Miyako at 17 percent. During the 2011 disasters, all Matsushima hotels interviewed stated that 
they supplied evacuees with water and food from its restaurants and gift shops, although these food 
were originally intended for normal consumption rather than for emergency use. The supply of fresh 
water was the most vital, due to infrastructure damages. As some hotels began to deplete its stock 
of food, Matsushima City regularly delivered blankets and food to hotels, ensuring that tourists’ 
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needs were continually met. Town officials were strongly confident that they are capable of meeting 
food needs for hotel guests during disaster events. Despite this, half of the hotels in Matsushima felt 
that both lack of manpower and money prevented them from maintaining emergency supplies. In 
Ishigaki, 50 percent stated lack of money that prevented them from adopting emergency supplies, 
while 13 percent stated lack of knowledge. Miyako had a far lower rate at 17 percent adoption. 67 
percent stated lack of money prevented them from adopting emergency supplies while 17 percent 
said lack of manpower (Fig 5). 
 
6. Results: Attitudes towards collaboration 
6.1 The hotel industry 
 
Figure 6 Results of survey that examines the hotel industry’s attitudes and motivations towards 
current public-private collaboration 
 Hotel industry stakeholders were asked to rate the collaborative planning process with 
other stakeholders towards disaster management. Ishigaki leads again, with high levels of positive 
stakeholder feedback on the six key variables towards a successful collaboration. On average, Ishigaki 
hotel’s strongly agreed that collaboration was inclusive, while agreeing that facilitation is fair and 
independent. The hotels somewhat agreed that current collaboration is meeting their needs, 
provided them equal opportunities to influence outcome, and that they were done through 



















three cities as stakeholders in Miyako and Ishigaki were ambivalent enough time was provided and 
Matsushima disagreeing. While Miyako agreed that collaboration was inclusive and somewhat 
agreed equal opportunities were given, overall hotels were undecided over the remaining areas. 
Matsushima’s hotels were undecided over consensus over collaboration planning and equal 
opportunities but agreed that the planning process was inclusive and somewhat agreeing that it met 
needs while providing independent facilitation.  
 
6.2 The municipalities 
 
Figure 7 Results of survey that examines the municipal government’s attitudes and motivations 
towards current public-private collaboration 
 In contrast to the views of the hotel industry, Ishigaki’s government was the most 
pessimistic towards collaboration. While both Matsushima and Miyako’s municipal government held 
nearly similar views over collaboration, either strongly agreeing or agreeing in the six key areas, 
Ishigaki only strongly agreed over stakeholder inclusiveness. Ishigaki remained undecided whether 
facilitation was independent or whether it met their needs, somewhat disagreed that consensus 
were made, and disagreed that enough time is given, nor were there equal opportunities presented 
in the collaborative process. These negative views towards collaboration were due to problems 
stemming from hotels that have yet offer their buildings as evacuation sites. While Ishigaki maintains 



















Misaki District of the city. During our interview, city officials felt that while there were an abundance 
of hotels in Misaki that could accommodate evaccuees, there were not enough in the neighboring 
Yashima District. There were at least four hotels in Yashima of which only one that collaborated with 
the city for disaster preparedness. When interviewed, that sole hotel surmised that the neighboring 
hotels may feel that disaster information may detract from the overall tourism experience and have 
opted to avoid collaborating with the city.  
 Matshushima and Miyako viewed the collaborative planning process very positively. Both 
the tourism section and the disaster section stated that they would do whatever it takes to support 
local businesses and provide all information. Limitations however are strictly due to resource 
concerns. Similarly Miyako representatives stated it is natural for towns to view collaboration 
positively but that in their case, limitations in the adoption of hotel based disaster risk management 




7.1 Manpower limitations  
Man power was one of the most common barriers towards adopting disaster preparedness 
initiatives, especially for evacuation training. Several hotels mentioned that it was difficult to allocate 
what few staff they have, to participate in evacuation drills, while having enough human resources 
available to take care of the hotel’s daily activities such as customer check in and cleaning. One hotel 
in Ishigaki said that they attempt to mitigate the manpower shortage by dividing its staff into two 
teams, with one participating in the first drill, and the second participating in the second drill months 
later. However during peak season, there is simply not enough staff to receive customers, let alone 
participate in training activities. For hotels in the Tohoku area, high turnover rates are a frequent 
issue as many entry level staff are young and eventually leave the area, as part of an ongoing 
demographics decline facing the region. As a result, staffs with disaster knowledge disappear and 
new staff needs to be re-trained. 
The lack of knowledge was a strong barrier in the development and adoption of multi-
lingual disaster pamphlets, especially in Miyako and Matsushima. However the reasons differed 
between the two cities. In the case of Matsushima, much of the reason stems from its smaller 
population and smaller staff at the town office. The existing manual was made with the resources 
and assistance of the Sendai Tourism, Convention and International Association (SenTIA). The town 
would eventually like to create something comparable to OCVB’s manual, but lacks the expertise 
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needed to compile the data as well as translation. As of 2017, Matsushima is considering working 
with neighboring Shiogama City to develop a similar manual. 
 
7.2 Complex relations  
Despite its existence, most hotels had no knowledge of Matsushima’s pamphlet. A third 
stakeholder, the Matsushima Tourism Association, functions as the intermediary between the town 
and local businesses. During interviews with the association and the town, it was clear that 
collaboration between the two were at times disjointed. For example, the association was unaware 
of the existence of Matsushima’s pamphlets, while the town office was unaware of the association’s 
development of hotel crises plan draft. Since the first interviews, there was a growing schism 
between the prefecture, town, and tourism association over strategic planning. This has influenced 
not only disaster preparedness initiatives, but other areas of tourism such as promotion and 
strategic planning. The municipality has repeatedly stated its goals of expanding outreach to foreign 
tourists which include disaster communication alongside tourism promotion. The town’s interest in 
the expansion of targeting foreign tourists was not reciprocated among other stakeholders. 
In contrast, stakeholder collaboration in Miyako was relatively smoother as the 
municipality, local tourism association, and hotel industries generally held strongly positive views of 
each other. This stems from the fact that members in the tourism division were formerly members 
of the disaster division and vice versa, while other members held double appointments within the 
city and various tourism associations, and related industries. The same mutual interests within 
Miyako city and between Miyako and Iwate Prefecture contributed to the speedier establishment of 
the Sanriku DMO, which encompasses all the coastal cities of Iwate and includes Miyako. However, 
as Miyako suffered far more extensive damages than Matsushima, and had significantly lower visitor 
numbers, the city and hotels are faced with difficulties on allocating its budget and limited 
manpower. While hotel occupancy rates are currently high, the city noted that most of the customers 
are involved in reconstruction. One hotel estimated that 90 percent of its guests are reconstruction 
workers and only 10 percent are actual tourists. In addition to this, hotels felt the assistance 
payments they receive from the government for reconstruction is insufficient. The costs may cover 
the rebuilding of the hotel, but did not address the decreasing revenue due to a decline in tourists 
as a result of Tohoku’s negative image. 
 
7.3 DMO approaches to disaster management 
 Although OCVB has existed since 1996, disaster management planning was relatively 
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recent, primarily inspired by the 2011 GEJE. OCVB acknowledged that initial attempts at 
collaboration with tourism stakeholders were unsuccessful as many in the hotel industry refusing to 
acknowledge the importance of disaster preparation and declining the adoption of a multilingual 
safety manual. This led to OCVB adjusting its language from a commanding “please use these 
manuals” to more cooperative “why don’t we learn how to improve disaster preparedness together”. 
The manuals are provided free of charge to hotels, and can be downloaded from its official site. 
 As staff training for evacuation has been limited, OCVB held the first hotel disaster 
evacuation workshop in Okinawa’s prefectural capital Naha on March 2017, with the participation 
of over 100 hotel representatives. The workshop imaged multiple disaster scenarios, such as what 
to do during the event of a magnitude 8.8m earthquake and 5.7 tsunami. The workshiops targeted 
how to handle local and foreign tourists, stranded tourists, and procedures for evacuation. 
 In Iwate, the Sanriku DMO began in late 2016 and encompasses all the prefecture’s coastal 
cities which are referred to as the Sanriku Region. When asked why a DMO was only created for 
Sanriku rather than the entire prefecture, Iwate Prefectural Office stated that the coastal and inland 
areas significantly differed in culture, economy, and especially in damages. The catastrophic 
damages combined with the smaller resources of the coastal cities necessitated the need of a 
specialized Sanriku area DMO that would allow these cities to pool their resources together and 
develop strategies similar to Okinawa. In the future, Iwate Prefecture envisioned the creation of a 
separate DMO for inland cities such as Hiraizumi. Due to its recent establishment, the Sanriku DMO 
is still in the exploratory phase, with current research focusing on examining market trends. Its staff 
remain extremely limited to a few people and it is not expected to begin strategic planning until 
several years. As of 2017, the Sanriku DMO has yet to establish any functions. 
 Matsushima is currently not part of any regional DMO, nor is neighboring Sendai. However 
further south in Miyagi Prefecture, a DMO called Miyagi Minami DMO was established in late 2016. 
This DMO consists of the 13 municipalities in southern Miyagi Prefecture. In an interview with Miyagi 
Minami DMO, a representative stated that the initial goal was a prefecture wide DMO but only 
succeeded in recruiting the southernmost cities. Like the Sanriku DMO, the Miyagi Minami DMO is 
still only in its exploratory phase, being limited to its small staff and researching how to approach its 
first strategic plans. There remains significant differences between Miyagi Prefecture and Miyagi 
Minami DMO over defining roles and strategic plans. This has led towards the possibility of Miyagi 
Prefecture establishing its own DMO with the remaining prefectural cities in 2018.  
 




 In the Japanese business system, workers are employed at a section for a period of 2 to 4 
years. This system is aimed to broaden knowledge and to prevent corruption. The benefits of such a 
system allows government employees to develop all around skills and experience of multiple 
departments [46]. This has often allowed different departments to better collaborate with each 
other due to shared experiences, as seen in the case with Miyako. Criticism of this system relate to 
how many of the employees do not come from educational backgrounds related to their sections. 
For example, a number of tourism department employees in our case studies cities, possess college 
degrees in unrelated fields while some did not continue to tertiary education. Additionally, this 
system breeds very few staff who are specialists in one particular field, reduces the accumulation of 
knowledge, with very few overseeing long term projects until its completion. During the duration of 
this research, at least three of the municipal representatives we’ve contacted had since changed 
departments. 
The formation of new DMOs in the Tohoku area offers an opportunity for academic 
contributions from researchers who specialize in areas that could be beneficial for tourism related 
topics. Large DMOs, such as the Hawaii Tourism Authority include board members from the 
University of Hawaii system, as well as frequent collaboration with the university’s school of 
businesses, Tourism industry management school, and the School of Ocean and Earth Science and 
Technology. Within Japan, OCVB’s board members include professors from Okinawa’s national 
university, the University of the Ryukyus, as well as numerous collaborations. Both the Sanriku DMO 
and the Miyagi Minami DMO have requested academic assistance in order to guide its strategic plans 
and inform them of what is working and what isn’t. However at both the municipal levels in Miyako 
and Matsushima, and at the prefectural levels in Miyagi and Iwate respectively, the tourism sections 
have all stated that involvement from local universities are virtually non-existent. For example, very 
few researchers from Tohoku University, the titular university of the region, have visited the local 
governments with Iwate Prefecture Tourism Division mentioning only two visitors (including the 
author), Miyagi Prefecture stating no researcher has visited beyond our group, and Matsushima 
mentioning only two visits (one of which is the author). Instead much of the visits have been directed 
towards municipal reconstruction and disaster divisions. In Miyako, a lone professor from Bunkyo 
University, located far south near Tokyo, has been assisting with the tourism division. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 Coastal tourism destinations are exposed to a number of natural hazards in which 
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structural mitigation measures can be limited due to the desire to preserve intrinsic assets needed 
for the tourism economy. Tourists on the other hand, may be unaware of these hazards, may lack 
knowledge of evacuation procedures, and maintain differing perceptions of risks. Literature has 
identified the roles the hotel industry can play in improving local area disaster resiliency through 
initiatives such as the establishment of official evacuation buildings, short-term refuge, 
dissemination of safety information, and evacuation training. 
 This research examined hotel-based disaster risk management in Matsushima in Miyagi 
Prefecture, and Miyako in neighboring Iwate Prefecture. Both cities were inundated by the 2011 
tsunamis and as a result, experienced deaths as well as a decline in tourism. On site field work and 
interviews revealed that the adoption rate of hotel based disaster risk initiatives were generally low 
in both cities. In Matsushima, although fatal casualties were very low, nearly all hotels interviewed 
had reported taking in evacuees in 2011. There are no official tsunami evacuation building signs 
placed on any hotels, but evacuation sites can be found in public areas such as local schools. Despite 
the presence of a multilingual disaster card, none were found within the hotels. Evacuation drills 
were mixed, with some hotels only joining after 2011. Matsushima excelled in providing emergency 
food as the municipal government was quick to provide food and blankets for evacuees. Although 
Matsushima has strong desire to expand adoption rates for the aforementioned activities, there are 
limitations due to significant differences between stakeholders, primarily the municipality and the 
Matsushima Tourism Association, and to some extent with the prefectural government. Stakeholder 
collaboration survey revealed significant gaps between the hotel industry and municipality over 
equal opportunities to influence decision making and sufficient time to understand information. 
 In contrast to Matsushima, Miyako suffered far higher damages and fatalities, yet received 
little evacuees due to the time of the tsunami during off-season, and the general unpopularity of 
Miyako as a tourism destination. Like Matsushima, adoption rates for hotel based disaster risk 
management initiatives remain low. Stakeholder collaboration was perceived to be slightly higher in 
Miyako than in Matsushima. The tourism association, hotels, municipality, and the prefecture held 
similar stances on limitations, but time was again a problematic issue towards collaboration. The 
main limitations in adopting hotel based disaster risk management initiatives in Miyako were 
primarily due to man power issues as most staff were still focusing on reconstruction and lack of 
money, as the economy continues to reel, affecting hotel revenue.   
Although Miyako was chosen for the purpose of literal replication with Matsushima, it was 
discovered to have been included as part the Sanriku DMO that was established in late 2016. 
However due to its recent establishment and lack of operations and strategic plans, it has yet to play 
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a direct role in disaster risk management. However the rationale behind its establishment highlights 
the limited resources small municipalities face and the need for a DMO to pool their resources 
together to overcome existing barriers together and develop tourism as well as disaster 
management plans that could be shared. Matsushima is currently not a part of any DMO but is 
expected to be a part of a new DMO one alongside with eight other cities in Miyagi Prefecture in 
2018.  
 For these new DMOs, there is great potential for them to expand into disaster risk 
management and to improve collaboration between the local government and businesses in a 
similar way that has been achieved by OCVB. Okinawa’s DMO has been able to overcome a number 
of the barriers, currently experienced by stakeholders in Matsushima and Miyako, through a number 
of initiatives. Firstly, OCVB was able to break through the reluctance of hotel businesses in 
participating in disaster risk management activities. To address problems facing evacuation drills and 
staff training, free evacuation courses were developed by OCVB for hotel owners. OCVB also 
developed a multi-lingual safety manual which includes information on local flora and fauna hazards 
as well as disaster mitigation strategies for tourists. While OCVB may be unable to provide recovery 
funding for hotel operators, it has also developed a series of communications and image restoration 
plans to immediately negate potential decline in tourism after a crises, as well as offering business 
continuity models for interested parties. Finally, there are a few cases where Okinawa Prefecture 
had even tasked OCVB the responsibility in creating a municipality tourism crises disaster plan, as in 
the case with Zamami Village. The success of OCVB in providing assistance has also led to 
Matsushima’s tourism division to also examine how Okinawa has approached collaboration win the 
hotel industry, and guide its own initiatives with the hotel industry and other tourism stakeholders. 
With Miyagi and Iwate seeking to revitalize their economy through further investments in tourism 
development, its ability to ensure the security of its visitors and create an image of safety and control, 
will be essential in recovering declining visitor numbers since 2011.  
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